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Introduction
Rules of origin and rules of cumulation are unavoidable parts of preferential regimes. They characterize unilateral trade preferences and free trade areas, FTAs. Rules of origin (henceforth ROOs), by determining the origin of a product, de…ne whether a good quali…es or not for preferential access. Rules of cumulation (henceforth ROCs) de…ne whether a …rm can use imported intermediate products, so that the …nal product of the importing …rm does not loose the originating status. A preferential regime can allow either for bilateral, diagonal or full cumulation. To qualify its …nal product for preferential access with bilateral cumulation 1 , a …rm can either use the domestic intermediates or the intermediates produced in a preference receiving country. Whereas, with diagonal cumulation, a …rm can use the intermediate goods coming from any of the preferential regime partners produced under the same ROOs and ROCs. Alternatively, a preferential regime can allow for full cumulation. In this case all the intermediates coming from free trade area partners can be used, regardless of the fact that the imported products qualify or not for preferential access.
Despite that rules of origin are formulated in a context of preferential trade liberalization, their e¤ects on trade ‡ows are rather ambiguous. More precisely, they can either prevent exporters from taking advantage of the preferential tari¤ or they can constitute a trade diverting factor. Indeed, as argued by Krishna (2005) , much of what we have learnt from the literature is that ROOs can provide hidden protection for intermediate inputs and that the e¤ect of rules of origin in the short run may be primarily in terms of trade ‡ows while in the long run it may take the form of investment ‡ows. On the other hand, as highlighted by Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2007) "permissive ROCs can mitigate the protectionist content of ROOs by expanding …rms'choice when it comes to their international supply networks".
The aim of this paper is to focus on the issue of bilateral versus diagonal or full cumulation. Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the combined e¤ect of ROOs and ROCs. To show that bilateral cumulation, as opposed to diagonal or full cumulation, can distort the purchase pattern of intermediate inputs, we model ROOs and ROCs by incorporating the Puga and Venables (1995) model into the Melitz framework using a three country setting. Puga and Venables (1995) show that in a model with a preferential trading arrangement between hub and spoke countries the hub-spoke arrangement lead to the relocation of industry into the hub country. However, as shown by Demidova, Krisna and Loo Kee (2006), a homogeneous …rm setting cannot take into account important results due to di¤erent trade policies. Indeed, Demidova,Krisna and Loo Kee (2006) build a heterogeneous …rm setting which shows that …rms sort according to the export markets and to the di¤erent types of trade policy. They model the response of Bangladesh …rms in two sectors, the woven and no woven sectors, with respect to the decision of exporting to the EU market, under the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative and to the US market, under the quota regime. In both cases …rms can take advantage of these trade policies only if they comply with ROOs. Modelling ROOs as an additional marginal and …xed cost they show that …rms that take advantage of the less restrictive EU's ROOs are less productive than those …rms that export to the US, where tari¤s are higher.
In our model we close the gap between these two models. On the one hand, we allow for di¤erent …rms responses. Firms can decide to invoke preferential tari¤s and thus, comply with rules of origin. A To con…rm our theoretical predictions, we bring the model to the data. The natural experiment is to consider the Pan European system of cumulation. The system introduced in 1997 has allowed the major part of the European Union's free trade partners to cumulate stages of production in order to qualify for preferential access in the European market. Since the literature that examines the combined e¤ects of rules of origin and rules of cumulation on supply choice is rather scarce, our empirical purpose is to shed light on the restrictive nature of ROOs and on the role of ROCs in mitigating the protectionist content of ROOs. To do so, we use an index of restrictiveness of Product Speci…c Rules of Origin constructed by Cadot, Carrère, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2005) . Their latter paper shows that rules of origin tend to be more restrictive for activities with greater processing (i.e. lower value added), and that non-least developing countries face restrictive ROOs in sectors in which they have a revealed comparative advantage (in the sense of high export shares).
To examine the impact of the relaxation of ROOs in the European context, Augier, Lai-Tong and Gasiorek (2007) consider the European Union Mediterranean Partneship and the Pan European system of cumulation. First they establish whether there is any evidence on the impact of cumulation from the trade data following the introduction of the Pan European system in 1997, which extended diagonal cumulation to the Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. They show that both at the aggregate and sectoral level the relaxation of rules of origin via the introduction of diagonal cumulation arrangements between the EU and its'trading partners generates positive e¤ects.
In line with this research is the paper by Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo, Suwa-Eisenmann and Tumurchudur (2004) , which studies the impact of ROOs on trade ‡ows in the case of NAFTA.
They argue that these may be representative of a North-South FTA. They …nd that the restrictiveness nature of ROOs impacts negatively on trade ‡ows. They predict that in absence of tari¤ change, the application of rules of origin lead …nal good producers to shift their purchases of intermediates to intra-FTA intermediates. Additionally if …nal goods are imperfect substitutes by origin, consumers will shift towards intra-FTA from rest of the world (ROW) trade if the bene…ts of complying with rules of origin are greater than zero.
The contribution of our paper is as follows. Absent ROCs, our model generates a hub spoke situation. This result is less strong than the situation predicted by the Puga-Venables (1995) framework due to the presence of the heterogeneous …rms setting. Moreover, absent ROCs, …rms in the spoke sort according to the ability of respecting rules of origin. This is line with the predictions of Krishna, Demidova and Loo Kee (2006) . Di¤erently from them we explicitly model the constraints imposed by rules of origin introducing an intermediate production sector. An important aspect of our paper is that we consider the situation in which diagonal ROCs are allowed between the spoke countries. Our model shows that ROCs do mitigate the e¤ect of ROOs by leading countries to a situation that is closer to a free trade situation.
In the empirical part we analyze how the extensive and intensive margins of trade are a¤ected by Speci…cally, for the EU 15, the probability of exporting the intermediate good decreases while the volume of trade increases. This e¤ect is con…rmed by the robustness check. These results suggest that the FTAs have been used to reorganized production inside the European Union spaghetti bowl.
Cumulation has increased the incentive to split the value chain of production among all the EU FTA partners, with the EU 15 shifting the intermediate stages of production to the peripheral countries and with a consequent increase in intra-…rm trade. As far as we know there are no other papers that apply the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (henceforth HMR) gravity equation using the Harmonised System (HS) 1992, which categorizes trade ‡ow along 5019 tari¤ lines.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of the evidence on trade and ROOs. Section three sets up the model and derives partial equilibrium results. Section four characterizes the equilibrium and investigates some comparative statics. In section …ve are discussed the main features of the Pan European system of cumulation, the empirical strategy and the results. The last section concludes.
Theoretical Framework
We study the e¤ect of a FTA with rules of origin and bilateral cumulation between a hub and two spoke countries. The preferential access to the FTA partner's market requires that …rms comply with ROOs and bilateral ROCs. Compliance with these rules restricts the possibility of using intermediate goods from the other spoke country. Rather than adopting a partial restriction in the use of inputs, we make the strong assumption that only intermediates from the origin and destination markets can be used when exporting under preferential tari¤. This assumption captures the essence of ROOs with bilateral cumulation, whose e¤ects are essentially on the inputs'choices made by …nal good producers.
As such, our assumption does not a¤ect the main message behind the model and it allows to keep the analysis as simple as possible 3 . For instance, EU rules of origin for cotton clothing stipulate that the manufacturing process must 'manufacture from yarn', implying that imported cotton fabric cannot be used and that the yarn must be sourced locally 4 .
The main value of our theory and key to our empirics lies in the consideration of changes in rules of cumulations. Speci…cally, to explore the role of cumulation in reducing the distortionary impact of preferential ROOs, we investigate the changes induced by the possibility of diagonal cumulation between the spoke countries.
Preferences
Consumers in each country share the same preferences over two …nal goods: a homogeneous good, z, and a di¤erentiated good, x. We assume a two-tier preference with Cobb-Douglas in the upper tier and CES in the lower tier. A fraction of income, , is spent on the di¤erentiated good, x, and a fraction (1 ) is spent on the homogeneous good, z. The utility function is:
where > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two products within the group and V is the set of available varieties. Given that preferences across varieties have the standard CES form, the demand function for a …nal good variety is: is the CES price index for the …nal good and E is the aggregate level of spending on the di¤erentiated good.
Technology and market structure
We focus on the e¤ects of ROOs with bilateral cumulation on supply networks. For this reason, the set-up of the model is based on three identical countries: a hub country and two spoke countries.
Each country is endowed with labor, L, which is supplied inelastically. There are three sectors, one homogeneous, one manufacturing sector and one di¤erentiated intermediate good sector. The homogeneous sector produces a good, z, with constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In this sector the technology is simple. We choose units of z such that one unit of labor is required per unit of output. Thus, the unit cost function is w, where w is the wage rate for labor. This unit cost function represents marginal and average costs. In the homogeneous sector, competition implies price equal marginal costs, p z = w. It is convenient to choose good z as the numeraire, so that p z = 1; hence, the pricing condition will become: 1 = w. As long as the homogeneous good z is produced in every country and is freely traded on international markets, the cost of producing this homogenous good is the same in every country, and hence, so are the wages.
The manufacturing sector produces a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated varieties, x(v), à la 
where p m is the price of the m good, is the unit input requirement. For simplicity, we assume that the intermediate good …rms are homogeneous and their trade frictionless 6 
where n = E= f is the equilibrium number of intermediate good varieties produced in each country and f is the Dixit-Stiglitz …xed cost of production.
The introduction of these restrictive rules of origin make …rms face a fundamental trade-o¤ between optimizing intermediate good source and having access to the preferential tari¤. To capture this key trade-o¤, while maintaining analytical tractability, we make the bold assumption that the restrictive ROOs take the form of an absolute prohibition on using intermediate varieties from non partner nations. Thus, if the restrictive ROOs are respected, the CES price index for intermediate is:
rather than (3) . Given our assumptions, we can …nd closed form solutions for (4) and (3). This shows that …rms face a trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency in production and preferential tari¤ for …nal good.
The homogeneous sector is not subject to trade costs as well as the intermediate good sector.
More speci…cally, we assume a frictionless world for these sectors which allows us to keep the analysis as simple as possible without a¤ecting the main results. Given this set-up, it follows that a certain number of …nal good producers will sell only domestically (D-type …rms) and a sub-sample of them, the more productive ones, will also export to the other markets (X-type …rms).
Concerning the intermediate good producers, their supply will depend on the demand of …nal good producers. As we describe in the next subsection, this, in turn, depends on the …nal good producers' decision to comply or not with ROOs and bilateral ROCs.
Introducing FTA with ROOs
The main value added of our theory is to deal with ROOs and bilateral cumulation (also called restrictive ROOs). We assume that each spoke country signs a FTA with the hub country. The existence of the FTA allows the …rms to choose between two export strategies. A …rm that wants the preferential tari¤, F T A < M F N , has to respect the restriction imposed by the ROOs and bilateral cumulation. This implies that the …rm that invokes preference for exporting in the hub (spoke) market can only use the intermediate input-varieties produced in its own domestic market and in the spoke (hub) country involved in the speci…c FTA. Moreover, ROO imposes a …xed cost, f R . This …xed cost is the sum of the market entry cost, f X , plus the administrative costs linked to the proof of originating status. When a …rm decides to respect these restrictions, it will face a larger …xed costs and a restricted choice of inputs but a lower tari¤, F T A < M F N . On the contrary, refusing the preferential access implies that the …rm can exploit a greater range of intermediate inputs, a lower …xed cost but a higher tari¤. The trade o¤ between asking or not for preferential access is due to the …xed and intermediate input costs versus the preferential tari¤.
The introduction of a FTA with ROO and bilateral cumulation will generate two types of exporting …rms. A certain number of exporting …rms will not ful…l the restrictive ROOs. Hence, they will not receive the preferential access. We call these …rms X-type …rms. On the other hand, there will be another fraction of exporting …rms, which ful…l the restrictive ROOs. We call these …rms R-type …rms. , that is common to every country. The support of the continuous random variable a is 0 a a 0 . Upon drawing its own parameter a, each …rm decides to exit and not to produce (this happens if it has a low productivity draw), or to produce.
Intermediate Results

Market entry decision of …nal good …rms
If it chooses to produce for its own domestic market, it pays the additional …xed market entry cost, f D . If the …rm chooses to export, without invoking preferential tari¤, it bears the additional market entry costs f X . If the …rm decides to respect the restrictive ROO, it faces a …xed cost, f R . This …xed cost is the sum of the market entry cost, f X , plus the administrative costs linked to the proof of originating status 8 . It follows that the …xed cost f R , which provides preferential market access, will be more attractive to larger …rms.
When a …rm decides to respect the restrictive ROOs, it will face a larger …xed costs, a restricted choice of inputs but a lower tari¤, F T A < M F N . On the contrary, refusing the preferential access implies that the …rm can exploit a greater range of intermediate inputs, a lower …xed cost but a higher tari¤. The trade o¤ between asking or not for preferential access is due to the …xed and intermediate 7 Where the subscript I stands for innovation. 8 All the …xed cost are in terms of labor.
input costs versus the preferential tari¤. Hence, the introduction of a FTA with restrictive ROOs will generate two types of exporting …rms.
Solving for the cost minimization problem, the pro…t function for D-type …rms, for which ROOs 
The modes of export vary according to the considered foreign market. In the case of a FTA partner, a …rm, in the origin country, can choose between two possible export strategies, which are related to the ful…lment of restrictive rules of origin. If a …rm decides to respect ROO and bilateral cumulation, the equilibrium pro…ts are:
whereas, if a …rm decides not to take advantage from preferential access, the equilibrium pro…ts are:
The introduction of FTA with ROO induces a sorting of exporting …rms into two groups. The …rst group decides to ful…l ROOs in order to enjoy the preferential access (5) . The second group, instead, is characterized by the …rms that decide to not accept the ROO and therefore the preferential access (6) . Comparing equation (5) with (6), …rms that ful…l ROO and bilateral cumulation face a higher intermediate good Price Index, P M;Roo , a higher …xed cost, f R , but a lower tari¤, F T A 1. For what concern the trade between the two spoke countries, since there is no agreement, the equilibrium pro…t for exporting will be always represented by (6) .
Rearranging terms and de…ning = P 
M;Roo , we can rewrite the equilibrium pro…ts from domestic sales as 9 :
where
If a …rm chooses to export, without ful…lling ROOs, then its equilibrium net operating pro…t in that market is:
If a …rm chooses to export ful…lling ROOs, the equilibrium net operating pro…t is:
where F T A = 1 F T A : Due to the assumptions underlying the model, …rms will be ranked according to the following regularity condition: this condition implies that the exporting pro…t functions, (8) and (9), will cross in a point, beyond which serving the FTA partner using rules of origin is pro…table 10 .
The pro…t functions are depicted in Figure 1 , which helps clarify the analysis.
1 0 More details are given in Appendix A.1
From Figure 1 , we can see that there is a trade o¤ between the preferential tari¤, which o¤ers a better market access, and the costs associated with respecting the originating status requirements.
The costs associated with originating status refer to a high price for the intermediate goods and a high …xed cost. Restrictive ROO constrains the sourcing decision of the …nal good …rms and it increases the …xed cost associated with exports. It follows that only large exporters can take advantage of a better market access while the small exporting …rms, not able to cope with the higher costs, have to renounce to the preferential access.
In sum the model has three cut-o¤s which derive from the regularity condition, described previously.
Namely, looking at Figure 1 , least e¢ cient …rms exit, a (v) > a D , most …rms sell only locally, a X < a (v) < a D , and some …rms export but using the MFN tari¤, a Roo < a (v) < a X , while most productive exporters respect ROO and gain tari¤ preference, a (v) a R .
Equilibrium Conditions
We now formalize the statements illustrated in Figure 1 .
The Cuto¤ Conditions
Let us de…ne the threshold marginal costs for each market. Using the equilibrium operating pro…t for serving the domestic market (7), we can derive the domestic cuto¤ condition:
That is …rms with a (v) below a D …nd it optimal to supply the local market while …rms with a (v) > a D expect negative pro…ts and exit the industry.
The choice in the case of the foreign markets is more complex, so it could be helpful to structure the discussion with the help of Figure 1 . As we see from the …gure the net operating pro…ts of supplying the foreign market rises under both modes of exporting. Firms with a X < a (v) < a D have positive operating pro…ts from sales in the domestic market, but they lose money if they choose to serve foreign markets. We use the net operating pro…t from exporting under MFN (8) to derive the X-type …rm cuto¤ without preferential access:
Thus, only …rms with a (v) a X will consider export to the other spoke country and to the hub market when ROO are not ful…lled.
Notice, from Figure 1 , that at a (v) = a X , exporting without ROO yields a higher net operating pro…t then exporting with ROO. This ordering switches, however, for …rms with a (v) a Roo , where this is de…ned as the a (v) where:
This last cuto¤ is obtained by equating the operating pro…ts from accepting ROO, (9) with the operating pro…t from doing export under MFN tari¤, (8) . This because by construction, a …rm will choose to supply by accepting ROO only if the ROO strategy is more pro…table than the export strategy under MFN, i.e. if this holds:
which can be rewritten as,
Notice that if a (v) a R , the export supply ful…lling ROO yields a higher net operating pro…t.
From the diagram it is clear that a X > a R . This implies that only the large exporters will use the preferential access while small exporters will continue to use the MFN tari¤.
Free Entry
In order to characterize the general equilibrium results, we specify the free entry conditions and the Price Indexes of the …nal good sector.
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating pro…ts of a potential entrant and the entry cost, E ( ) f I . This condition holds for all type of …rms. The cumulative density function is G(a), with support: [0; ::: ; a 0 ], where for simplicity we can set a 0 = 1: The free entry condition for a spoke country can be de…ned as:
where s and h stand for spoke and hub respectively. The free entry condition for the hub country can be de…ned as:
Note that the cuto¤ a X_hs as well as a X_sh represent the threshold marginal cost of exporting …rms which do not export under ROOs.
Price Index
The Price Index of the …nal good in a spoke country is de…ned as:
The Price Index for the …nal good in the hub country is:
Parametrization: Pareto Distribution
In order to …nd closed form solutions, we use a speci…c parametrization for the distribution, the Pareto distribution, whose empirical importance has been proved (see 
where k and a 0 are the shape and scale parameter, respectively. The shape parameter k represents the dispersion of cost draws. An increase in k would imply a reduction in the dispersion of …rm productivity-draws. Hence, the higher is k the smaller is the amount of heterogeneity 11 .
We assume that the support of the distribution [0; :::; a 0 ], where a 0 represents the upper bound of this distribution, is identical for every country. The properties of the Pareto distributions lead to a productivity distribution of surviving …rms which is also Pareto with shape k. More precisely, since a …rm will start producing only if it has at least a productivity of 1=a D , the probability distribution of supplying as an exporter is conditioned on the probability of successful entry in each market. Hence the truncated cost distribution is given by:
where the fractal nature of the Pareto is exploited. Here the support is [0; :::; a D ]. Given the assumed parametrization, we can explicitly solve the free entry conditions and the Price Index of the …nal good 12 .
General Equilibrium Analysis
We analyze the main implications of our model, by looking at the results obtained for the hub and one of the two spoke countries. We analyze one spoke country since we have assumed perfect symmetry between the two spokes. In Appendix A.2, we present the closed form solutions of the demand shifter (B d and B o ), the corresponding equilibrium cut-o¤s and the number of varieties.
We turn now to comparative statics. We …rst look at the impact of a free trade area with restrictive ROOs. Afterwards, we relax the restrictiveness of ROOs by allowing diagonal cumulation among the countries.
The Impact of Restrictive ROOs
In line with Krishna, Demidova and Loo Kee (2006), we …nd that the introduction of ROOs with bilateral cumulation results in a reduction of the aggregate productivity in both the hub and the spokes. Firms sort in three groups: domestic …rms, exporting …rms which do not ful…l ROOs and exporting …rms which do ful…l ROOs.
The Impact of Relaxing ROOs via Diagonal Cumulation
To analyse the role of cumulation in reducing the distortionary impact of restrictive ROOs, we give a graphical intuition of the e¤ect of diagonal cumulation on …rms'productivity. Then we present a more general discussion of the impact of ROOs with diagonal cumulation in the hub and spoke situation.
Graphical Intuition. To build intuition we can use a partial equilibrium version of Figure 1 , where the B's are held constant. This means that the …nal good producers that ask for preferential access face now a lower intermediate price index. This in turn, allows them to charge a lower price, altering competition in both markets.
The increase in competition changes the …nal outcomes.
The lowering of prices by the e¢ cient …rms will lower the demand shifter faced by all …rms. This will force out the marginal D-type (i.e. lower a D ). It will also force the marginal exporters to stop exporting (i.e. a X will fall). The impact on export productivity is slightly more subtle than in Melitz In summary, relaxing ROOs via diagonal cumulation leads to three e¤ects for the …nal good producers. First, least e¢ cient …rms are driven out from the market. Thus, the average productivity of the countries increases. Second, since the restriction on the intermediate good is relaxed, a larger range of exporting …rms ask for preferential access (i.e. a R will increase). Hence, the possibility of diagonal cumulation allows a larger number of exporting …rms to take advantage of the FTA. Lastly, least productive exporters stop supplying the foreign markets.
Although it is not formalized in the model, it is possible to deduce the impact of diagonal cumulation on outside countries. As a consequence of increased competition within the hub and spoke countries, it is possible to predict that outsider exporters …nd it more di¢ cult to supply the FTA partner.
Number of Firms.
As a result of diagonal cumulation the total number of active …rms is declining in both the hub and spoke countries. This is due to the increased level of competition.
Testable Implications: Extensive and Intensive Margins.
The results of this model yield a set of testable predictions concerning the productivity level, the number of …rms, the extensive and the intensive margins of R-type and X-type …rms 14 . In what follows we focus mainly on the extensive and the intensive margins of exports.
Testable Implication 1. Diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the number of …rms exporting from the hub to the spoke, and from the spoke to the hub, and to a decrease in the number of …rms exporting among the spokes. This last result di¤ers from what we …nd in the empirical part (where the extensive margin is positive). However, we should keep in mind that in the empirical part we mainly consider preferential trade among spokes, so we do not capture trade under MFN.
The number of varieties exported increases for the hub-spoke and spoke-hub trade because the relaxation of ROOs makes cheaper intermediate goods available without renouncing to the preference.
On the other hand, the number of varieties exported decreases for the spokes, because few …rms will now choose to export under MFN. Since we model the intermediate sector as homogeneous, we do not have any theoretical prediction regarding the intermediate good.
Testable Implication 2. Diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the intensive margin of the …nal good exported from the hub to the spoke, from the spoke to the hub and among the spokes. The relaxation of ROOs is increasing the value of trade.
Welfare E¤ects of Trade Liberalization
From the indirect utility function we can examine the welfare of consumers. Since the indirect utility function 15 is given by V = E=P , where P is the standard CES price index, we can examine the welfare e¤ects simply by examining how P is changing. A greater openness will increase the welfare by lowering the price index 16 , as well as a decrease in the domestic cuto¤. W/P? 1 4 See Appendix A.4. for derivations. 1 5 Without loss of generality, in this welfare analysis we are only concerned about the di¤erentiated good. 1 6 It can nevertheless happen that when trade costs are high and the number of foreign activities is strictly greater than the number of domestic …rms, the e¤ect of product varieties on welfare is negative (Melitz, 2002) .
Empirical Framework
Our theoretical model predicts that diagonal cumulation relaxes ROOs leading to di¤erent e¤ects among hub and spokes countries. Following our model, we …nd that relaxing the restrictive nature of ROOs induces an increase in the extensive and intensive margins of the …nal good for both the hub and the spoke.
Since we model the intermediate sector following the standard Krugman 1980, we do not have any predictions on the extensive and intensive margins of the intermediates. However, it is straightforward that in our model the introduction of diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the extensive and intensive margin of the intermediate good for the spoke countries. Instead, for the hub countries, it is more di¢ cult to make a clear prediction. Thus, we rely on the empirical model to identify the e¤ect of cumulation on the intermediate good export.
We expect the following results. Firstly, following our theoretical predictions, we expect diagonal cumulation to increase the hub exports of the …nal good. The e¤ects of diagonal cumulation are less straightforward for the intermediates. Indeed, on one hand diagonal cumulation reduces the protection granted to the hub intermediate producers; on the other hand the higher number of …rms in the world might increase the demand for the intermediate. Secondly, diagonal cumulation increases spoke exports in both the intermediate and …nal good. Thirdly, for what concern the spoke-spoke trade, we expect that spoke-spoke exports increase as well. Finally, in line with our theoretical model, we expect that relaxing ROOs has the same e¤ect on the extensive and intensive margin of trade for the …nal good.
In what follows, we propose an empirical investigation of the e¤ect of relaxing ROOs. More precisely, to test the predictions of the model, we look at the impact of diagonal cumulation taking as a natural experiment the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS). The system introduced in 1997, has allowed the major part of the EU 15 FTA partners to cumulate stages of production in order to qualify for preferential access in the European market. Over the years the EU 15 signed to be interpreted as the overall e¤ect of being part of the same FTA. We decided to omit preferential tari¤ for two main reasons: …rstly preferential tari¤ would have been highly correlated with the ROO Index used and secondly due to the many missing values contained in the data on preferential tari¤.
We intentionally analyze the trade pattern in the PECS zone by looking separately at the export from the EU 15 to the FTA partners and vice-versa. Finally, we look at the export among the EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries. We provide separate analysis since the model predicts di¤erent e¤ect according to the direction of trade. The introduction of relaxed ROOs seems to increase trade in intermediate goods among the peripheral (spoke) countries. Figure 3 gives an idea of the e¤ect of relaxing ROOs in a speci…c spoke country. In order to examine whether the pattern of trade follows the theoretical predictions, we bring the model to the data. To do this we follow the two steps procedure adopted by HMR (2008) in order to correct for the sample selection e¤ects and the presence of …rms heterogeneity. Di¤erently from HMR, we applied the strategy using the HS 1992 classi…cation, which disaggregates trade ‡ows across 5019 tari¤ lines. In the following sections, we highlight the empirical strategy and the econometric speci…cation of the model. In section 5.2 we provide the results that follow from the empirical setting and a comparison with the theoretical predictions.
Two Steps Procedure
Using a two step procedure we estimate the e¤ect on trade of more relaxed ROOs. We consider separately changes in hub-spoke, spoke-hub and spoke-spoke trade as a consequence of ROOs with diagonal cumulation. To avoid the classical mistake we follow HMR to consider the …rm heterogeneity aspect.
The …st step of this procedure consists in estimating the extensive margin of trade, i.e. the probability of exporting. Generally, the latent variable is determined by: 
this represents the probability that country o exports to d, conditional on the observed variables, where (:) is the cdf of the unit-normal distribution.
To simplify notation, we follow HMR in assuming the existence of a lower bound in the Pareto distribution 17 . More speci…cally, we set G(a) = (a k a k L )=(a k D a k L ); k > ( 1) : As HMR, we allow for a x < a L for some o-d pairs, inducing zero export from d to o 18 . This speci…cation allows for asymmetric bilateral trade ‡ows including zeros.
We de…ne y odkt as ratio between the export cuto¤ a x and the lower bound, a L .
Using 11 and the relationship existing between (3) and (4), we can express the probability of observing positive trade ‡ows as follows 19 :
and (2=3) 20 : Equation (19) is the ratio of the variable export pro…ts for the most productive …rm, i.e. with a = a L , to the …xed export costs. Hence, we observe positive exports only when the elements inside end up being larger than one. Using this speci…cation we can rewrite the latent variable as:
where lower case letters represent the variables in logarithmic form.
Let^ be the predicted probability of export that is derived from equation (19), thenŷ odkt = 1 (^ )
is the predicted value of the latent variable.^ andŷ odkt can be used to construct the inverse Mills ratio, odkt , which represent the standard Heckman correction for standard sample selection, which corrects for the bias generated by the unobserved country pair level shocks. On the other hand, following HMR, …rm heterogeneity is taken into account by the introduction of the non linear term equal to the sum of the predicted latent variable and the Mills ration, i.e.ŷ odkt +^ odkt .
Controlling for both …rms heterogeneity the selection of country pairs into trading partner we can estimate the bilateral trade ‡ow. More precisely, in our model the values of per …rm bilateral exports 1 7 This assumption does not change any of our results. 1 8 Where ax represents the cuto¤ of being a successful exporter. 1 9 Using equations (3) and (4), we …nd P 
Thus the total bilateral exports will be the sum of the value of export of …rms that ful…l ROOs and …rms which export under MFN.
, can be simpli…ed to:
Then, assuming = (2=3) , the total bilateral exports reduce to:
Taking logarithm the expression can be rewritten as:
where E d is expenditure and is proxied using nominal GDP. The price index of the …nal good is proxy with importers …xed e¤ect. Finally, we introduce year dummies to deal with business cycle and exchange rate ‡uctuations.
Note, that in the Panel that looks at the exports from the EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries to the EU 15, the GDP of the importing country and the importer country …xed e¤ect is captured by the year dummies. Instead, in the panel that looks at the export from the EU 15 to the EFTA, BAFTA, CEFTA and MED countries, the GDP of the exporting country and the exporter …xed e¤ect is captured by the year dummies.
Results
In the estimation procedure we divide the panel into three sub panels: export from EU 15 to the EFTA, BAFTA CEFTA and MED countries (called exports from hub to spoke), exports from these last countries to the EU 15 (called exports from spoke to hub), and …nally the exports among FTAs (called exports among spoke).
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we report the results of the …rst step procedure: the extensive margin of trade. These tables show the probability of exporting from hub to spoke, the probability of exporting from spoke to hub and the probability of exporting among spokes respectively. In Table 4 and 5 are provided the results concerning the second step procedure: the intensive margin of trade.
The model prediction concerning the exports from hub to spoke is that diagonal cumulation leads to an increase in the extensive margin of the …nal good. As anticipated above, we do not have any theoretical prediction regarding the intermediate good. The model's prediction concerning the exports from spoke to hub is that diagonal cumulation increases the extensive margin of trade of the …nal good. We also expect that there will be a similar e¤ect on the extensive and intensive margins of the intermediate. In Table 2 we explore these predictions. In line with the theoretical predictions we …nd that restrictive ROOs increase the probability that EFTA, A comparison between Table 1 and 2 highlights that the introduction of PECS seems to have accentuated the reorganization of production through the relaxation of ROOs. The total e¤ect of ROOs, i.e. the sum of the ROO Index and the interaction term between the ROO Index and the Pan-European dummy, leads to a 1.1% increase in the probability that the hub exports the …nal good, while it decreases by 0.6% the probability of exporting. If we compare these results with the ones form This boosts …nal good trade also between the hub and the spoke countries.
The last prediction of the model concerns the e¤ect of diagonal cumulation in the spoke-spoke trade.
In the theoretical model we …nd that relaxing ROOs increases the spoke-spoke exports. Table 3 Table 4 reports the second step estimation results for trade ‡ows from hub to spoke countries. In Table 5 we have similar results for the export from the spoke to hub. Due to large amount of data involved in the spoke to spoke panel (more than 15 million data points), we were unable to perform this last step procedure for trade ‡ows among spokes. the hub while increase the volume of the already exported intermediates. A potential reason behind this result could be attributed to the production shift from the hub to the spoke countries. This production shift could have occurred through the establishment of subsidiaries, leading to an increase in intra-…rm trade. Table 6 to 11 show some sensitivity analysis. We perform two types of robustness checks: a logit and a tobit estimation. Logit estimations represent the probability of exporting and thus, look at the e¤ects at the extensive margin of trade. Logit estimates con…rm the results of the probit estimations. The only exception concerns the e¤ect of being part to the same FTA in the case of spoke to spoke trade.
Robustness checks
There is not a rule of thumb for deciding whether logit or probit procedure should be preferred. We choose probit due to the fact that the normal distribution can be linked to the pareto distribution. 
A.3. ROOs with Diagonal Cumulation
The model is similar to the one solved before, what changes are the price indeces of the intermediates which now become identical:
A.4. Extensive and Intensive Margins
The value of exports of a typical R-type …rm tends to in…nity as 'a'approaches zero, while for intermediate a's the value of exports equals to:
From the R-type cuto¤ condition we can derive the following expression:
replacing (24) in (23) 
